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Abstract: Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), formed by com-
puters embedded in vehicles and the traffic infrastructure, are ex-
pected to develop in the near future to improve traffic safety and
efficiency. To this end, VANETs should be designed to be resistant
against various abuses and attacks. In this paper, we first review the
existing proposals to provide security, privacy, and data aggregation
in vehicle-to-vehicle communication. We then address the fundamen-
tal issue of achieving these conflicting properties in a unified solu-
tion, having observed that separate efforts cannot fulfill the VANET
design objectives. A set of new mechanisms are suggested for effi-
ciently managing identities and securely compressing cryptographic
witnesses, which are among the major obstacles to the deployment of
strong security mechanisms in VANETs. Finally, we employ the stan-
dard threshold cryptographic technology to improve the basic protocol
with robustness.
Keywords authentication, vehicle privacy, data aggregation,
VANETs.
1. Introduction
With the fast advancement and pervasive deployment of information and wireless
communication technologies, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET) are expected
to develop in the near future (see Blau, 2008). A VANET consists of on-board
units (OBUs) embedded in vehicles serving as mobile nodes and road-side units
(RSUs) working as the information infrastructure located in the critical points of
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the road. OBUs and RSUs are equipped with built-in sensory, data processing,
and wireless communication modules. These modules allow vehicles and road-
side infrastructure units to communicate with each other over single or multiple
hops to exchange and share information about the routine driving status reports of
vehicles and the driving environment changes. With these mechanisms, the OBUs
and RSUs form a self-organized network which is the first commercial version of
mobile ad hoc networks.
1.1. Related work
VANETs have various potential applications. The main thrust behind VANETs
is applications related to traffic safety. According to the World Health Organi-
zation (see WHO, 2009), approximately 1.3 million people die each year on the
world’s roads, and between 20 and 50 million sustain non-fatal injuries. Many
traffic accidents come from the lack of cooperation between drivers. By giving
more information about possible conflicts, most life-endangering accidents can be
averted. VANETs also facilitate traffic optimization. Indeed, vehicles can collect
data about traffic jams, weather or road surface conditions, construction zones,
highway or rail intersections, emergency vehicle signal preemption, etc., and be-
come information sources by sending those data to other vehicles in the VANET.
These mechanisms enable transportation administration authorities to guide ve-
hicles and manage them electronically (e.g. speed control, permits, etc.), much
more efficiently than with traditional manual administration. Finally, in addition
to safety-related applications, value-added services can be provided via VANETs.
By implementing advanced electronic payment protocols in VANETs, one can
expect to pass a toll collection station without having to reduce speed, wait in
line, look for some coins and so on. As GPS systems have become available in
many vehicles, it is also possible to realize location-based services in VANETs,
for instance, finding the closest fuel station, restaurant and hotel. Other kinds of
services include infotainment, vehicle-based electronic commerce and so on. All
these services lead to a more comfortable driving experience for drivers.
Having realized the great commercial opportunities of VANETs, many aca-
demic and industrial organizations are committed to developing them. In the
USA, the Dedicated Short Range Communications (see DSRC, 2011) standard
is being developed to support wireless communications for vehicles and road-side
infrastructure. In Europe, the Car2Car Communication Consortium deals with
vehicular communication standardization. With OBUs having a wireless connec-
tion to Internet, some infotainment can be provided, e.g., Microsoft MSN TV and
KVH Industries have introduced an automotive vehicle Internet access system
named TracNet, which can bring Internet service to any in-car video screen. It is
predicted that the market of VANETs can be up to billions of Euros in the near
future.
Despite the potentially great benefits derived from VANETs, there are many
challenges, especially conflicting security, privacy and storage requirements (see
Ma and Tsudik, 2010). Among these concerns, security is the primary focus (see
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Raya et al., 2007; Kaza et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2009; Alpcan and Buchegger,
2011). VANETs aim at providing a safer and more comfortable driving environ-
ment by allowing vehicles to periodically disseminate messages to other vehicles
in their vicinity. However, selfish vehicles can also exploit this mechanism to send
fraudulent messages for their own profit. Malicious vehicles may impersonate in-
nocent ones to launch attacks without being caught. Driving privacy or vehicle
anonymity is another critical concern in VANETs (see Sampigethaya et al., 2007;
Sun et al., 2010). Usually, to achieve security, vehicle-generated messages must be
signed so that the receiving vehicles can verify that these messages have been orig-
inated by authentic sources and have not been modified during transmission (see
Zhang et al., 2010). However, with these signatures, it is possible for attackers to
identify who generated a vehicular message containing speed, location, direction,
time and other driving information. A lot of private information on the driver
can be inferred if the driving pattern of his/her car can be tracked. Furthermore,
the signed vehicle-generated messages have to be stored by the receiving vehicles
for possible liability investigation: if some signed messages are later found false
and to have misguided other vehicles into accident, the message generators and
endorsers should be traceable. However, vehicular messages, especially their ap-
pended signatures, grow linearly with time while the storage capacity of OBUs in
the vehicles is limited. Therefore, security and privacy of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
communications need to be conciliated with data aggregation/compression.
1.2. Our work
In this paper, we first review the state of the art of security, privacy and data
aggregation in VANETs. Threats to be resisted include eavesdropping, imper-
sonation, source spoofing, message modification and replay, identity theft, and
privacy compromise. We note that the existing work treats security, privacy and
data aggregation separately, which is a flawed approach because they are not in-
dependent issues. For instance, security requires the vehicular messages to be
stored for a long period but the storage space of OBUs in vehicles is limited; data
aggregation can alleviate storage consumption in vehicles but it may potentially
weaken the security of VANETs; privacy requires the vehicular messages to be
anonymous and this may potentially degrade the trustworthiness of V2V commu-
nication because the generators of messages are indistinguishable and cannot be
identified for liability; and most privacy mechanisms aggravate the storage over-
head at vehicles. These observations imply that a unified solution is needed to
achieve the conflicting goals of security, privacy and data aggregation in VANETs.
We suggest a set of new mechanisms for efficiently managing identities and se-
curely compressing cryptographic witnesses, which are among the major obstacles
to the deployment of strong security in VANETs. We also exploit standard thresh-
old cryptographic technology to improve the robustness. The resulting protocol
efficiently addresses some implementation concerns. It allows new RSUs to the
deployed or enable some RSUs to update their keys and certificates even if some
traffic adminstration offices are occasionally unavailable. It also allows new ve-
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hicles to register to the system and facilitates for some vehicles to update their
keys and certificates in the case that some system administrative authorities are
compromised.
1.3. Paper organization
Sections 2, 3 and 4 review, respectively, security, privacy and aggregation solutions
in VANETs. Section 5 describes an approach achieving simultaneously security,
privacy and aggregation. Section 6 improves the protocol with a robust system
setup. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Security challenges and countermeasures
There are various categories of attacks against the security of VANETs. The first
category is vehicular message source cheating, a.k.a. spoofing or impersonation:
an attacking vehicle generates messages to cheat receiving vehicles by imperson-
ating other vehicles (see Daza et al., 2008). This is attractive for an attacker to
generate bogus messages to misguide target vehicles to his/her own advantage
without being caught later when the messages are found to be false. A related
attack is the Sybil attack (see Zhou et al., 2010): the attacker generates several
copies of the same cheating message by impersonating several source vehicles to
deceive the receivers into believing that there are many vehicular sensors sensing
the same driving environment; this increases the likelihood of receivers believ-
ing the content of the cheating message. Such an attack is powerful especially
when receivers use some threshold/voting mechanism to decide whether they ac-
cept a message as true. The second category of attacks against security is to
modify/replay messages generated by vehicles. If there is no security mechanism,
the receiving vehicles cannot distinguish whether the received messages are in-
tact/fresh or not. Therefore, they may be misguided and led into making wrong
decisions, which may benefit the attackers or result in traffic accidents. The third
category of attacks against security consist of generating incorrect messages to
cheat other vehicles while writing a random identity in the identity field of the
message. As a result, the receiving vehicles might be fooled but the attacker can
deny having originated these bogus messages, because the random identity cannot
be linked with the attacking vehicle.
Attacks against security can be thwarted by providing authentication, integrity
and non-repudiation in vehicular communications. Authentication implies that, if
a message is verified to be valid, then it comes from the claimed source. Integrity
means that the received message has not been modified during transmission, and
non-repudiation states that, if Alice generated a message, she cannot later deny
authorship of the message. Authentication, integrity and non-repudiation can
be simultaneously achieved using a cryptographic signature. That is, a vehicle
generates a message with a timestamp, it signs the message with its private key
and then it sends the message together with the signature on the message to other
vehicles. The message will be trusted only if its signature is verified to be valid.
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There are two ways to implement signatures in VANETs. The most commonly
suggested one is to employ a conventional public key infrastructure (PKI) (see
DSRC, 2011). This approach requires the existence of a trusted third party called
certification authority (CA). A CA can be materialized by some transportation
administration office (TAO). A vehicle can register to a CA with its public key by
showing that it holds the secret key corresponding to the public key. Then the CA
generates a certificate for the public key. Finally, the registered vehicle can sign
any message with its secret key. The receiving vehicle accepts the received message
only if both the certificate of the public key and the signature on the message
are valid. Traditional PKI-based signatures incur a heavy overhead to generate,
distribute, store, verify, and revoke certificates of a huge number of vehicles. An
alternative is to implement identity-based signatures in VANETs (see Sun et al.,
2008; Jiang et al., 2009). In this approach, the public key of a vehicle is just its
recognizable identity, e.g. the licence plate number; the private key is generated
by a private key generator (PKG), e.g. the transportation administration office,
by taking as inputs the PKG master secret key and the vehicle’s unique identity.
Then the registered vehicle can sign messages similarly to the PKI setting, but
it does not require any certificate because the vehicle identity as a public key is
recognizable and the vehicle can only have the secret signing key after registration.
Hence, using ID-based signatures eliminates the requirement of certificates in
VANETs.
The signature-based authentication of vehicular messages can be strengthened
by a voting/threshold mechanism. With this mechanism (see Daza et al., 2008;
Wu et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011), a message is trusted only if it has been endorsed
by at least a threshold number of vehicles. The motivation behind the threshold
mechanism is the fact that a message with a valid signature is not necessarily
correct or truthful. For instance, an attacking vehicle (e.g., a stolen car) may sign
a wrong message to cheat other vehicles. It is assumed that if an event is sensed
and endorsed by more vehicles, then the corresponding message is more trustable.
Hence, the threshold mechanism can be used to thwart the above attacks. Voting
can take place at either the message-generator side or the message-verifier side.
In the former case, a threshold of sensing vehicles cooperatively sign the same
message and a verifier is convinced if the jointly generated signature is valid. In
the latter case, each sensing vehicle independently signs the same message and the
verifier is convinced if it receives at least a threshold number of distinct signatures
on the same message. Due to the high mobility of vehicles and the volatility of
connections between them, verifier-side voting is easier to implement.
Authenticating vehicular communications using signatures also raises a num-
ber of practical challenges. Firstly, it raises the concern of vehicle privacy. To
authenticate a vehicle-generated message, a signature must be included together
with a public key or an identity which can be used to uniquely identify the
message-generating vehicle. Note that the vehicle-generated message contains
many sensitive data. By collecting and linking messages with the vehicle identity,
an attacker can infer much private information about the driver such as her mood,
personality and life style. Secondly, the security solutions raise the challenge of
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checking against the list of compromised vehicles. This is especially serious when
PKI-based signatures are employed (see Wasef and Shen, 2009; Wasef et al., 2010a,
b; Haas et al., 2011a), because, whenever a vehicle verifies a signature, it also has
to check against a list of revoked certificates which grows linearly with time. Dis-
tributing, storing and checking this revocation list becomes a heavy burden after
a secure VANET has been up and running for some time. This problem also
appears in VANETs using ID-based signatures. In this case, if a vehicle is com-
promised due to the leakage of secret signing keys, the corresponding identities
should be revoked. Hence, one faces the problem of checking revocation lists as
in the case of VANETs using PKI-based signatures. Thirdly, establishing liability
raises the challenge of storing numerous vehicular messages together with their
signatures, the corresponding public keys and their certificates. Each vehicle can
be assumed to periodically send messages over a single hop every 300ms within
a distance of 10s travel time (see DSRC, 2011), which means a distance range
between 10m and 300m. Assume that an OBU is on for two hours every day (taxi
and bus may run longer than that every day) on average and the vehicle is in a
40m road of 80 vehicles/km2. Suppose that each message has to be stored for at
least one year. Then a vehicle has to store about 8.4× 108 signatures plus their
corresponding public keys and certificates as cryptographic witnesses. Assume
that an elliptical curve cryptosystem is used, which is very efficient in bandwidth
consumption, e.g., about 22 bytes, 44 bytes and 22 bytes for each signature, public
key and certificate for the available shortest signature, respectively. A vehicle has
to store about 7.4 × 1010 bytes as cryptographic witnesses. Thus, the storage of
these data is a heavy burden for vehicles whose OBUs have usually very limited
storage capacity.
3. Privacy challenges and countermeasures
Since the security mechanisms in VANETs alone do not guarantee vehicle privacy,
a number of efforts have been directed at tackling the privacy threats in VANETs.
Generally, two approaches are employed, one based on pseudonyms and the other
on group signatures.
Pseudonyms in VANETs allow both security and (conditional) privacy to be
achieved (see DSRC, 2011; Raya and Hubaux, 2005; Sun et al., 2010). With this
approach, a vehicle has many public keys as pseudonyms, and the CA authen-
ticates each public key with a certificate of short duration, say, several minutes.
That is, the CA knows the real identity of the owner of the public keys. Then the
vehicle can authenticate or endorse vehicular messages as in the case of regular
signatures. Once the lifetime of a public key expires, the key will never be used
again. Since each pseudonym is used only a few times and/or for a very short
period, an attacker cannot link the pseudonym with the real identity of the vehi-
cle. However, using this approach: i) each vehicle needs to pre-load a huge pool
of pseudonyms, i.e., the public keys and their certificates; and ii) the CA also
needs to maintain all the anonymous certificates of all the vehicles to trace the
originator of a malicious traffic report message endorsed with some pseudonym,
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which results in substantial certificate management burden. To relieve this over-
head, identity-based signatures with many fake identities for each vehicle can also
be resorted to (see Jiang, et al., 2009). However, similarly to what we discussed
in Section 2, using ID-based signatures does not reduce the overhead of checking
revocation lists, although it eliminates the requirement of certificates inherent to
the PKI setting.
Group signatures are an alternative to achieve privacy (see Lin et al., 2007;
Wu et al., 2010) in VANETs. In a group signature, there is a group manager who
maintains the group; members may join or leave the group dynamically. To join
the group, a member holding a private signing key can register her public key with
the group manager. The manager generates a secret certificate for the member.
Then the member can anonymously sign any message on behalf of the group with
her secret signing key and secret group certificate. A verifier can verify the group
signature with only the group public key but cannot know which registered vehicle
is the message generator. However, if necessary, the group manager can reveal
the originator of any group signature. Group signatures can be implemented in
VANETs to achieve vehicular communications authentication and vehicle privacy,
by letting the transportation office play the role of group manager and vehicles the
role of group members. The main merit of the group signature based technique
over the pseudonym approach is that the former overcomes the limitation of pre-
storing a large number of anonymous certificates.
Authentication of vehicular communications based on group signatures is con-
ceptually simple. However, it also raises a number of challenges for practical de-
ployment. Although group signatures eliminate the requirements of pre-loading
a large number of pseudonyms and managing PKI-based certificates, a list has to
be maintained to record the compromised vehicles. Whenever verifying a group
signature, the verifier must also check whether the message generator has been
revoked. Observe that the revocation list grows as time passes. The system per-
formance may greatly degrade after the system has been deployed for some time.
Furthermore, group signatures are usually much longer than regular signatures
and the existing secure group signatures do not allow aggregation. If a message
is endorsed by a number of anonymous vehicles, then the same number of group
signatures has to be appended. This causes a heavy communication overhead for
message relay and an expensive storage load for saving witnesses for the purpose
of accident investigation.
4. Performance challenges and aggregation
Although data aggregation is important in VANETs, only few proposals have
addressed this issue. In the work of Piccolini et al. (2006), it is suggested to
let vehicles send unsigned semantically aggregated information. This solution
saves bandwidth and does not require receiving vehicles to verify any signatures
or certificates. However, since no authentication mechanism is employed, this
solution does not provide security and the received vehicle-generated message
cannot be used as evidence in court. Also, privacy is not guaranteed, which is a
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major problem in VANETs.
The goal of aggregation can be partially realized with probabilistic verification
and storage. A probabilistic verification scheme is proposed by Zhang et al.
(2008) whereby vehicles cooperatively work to probabilistically verify only a small
percentage of these message signatures based on their own computational capacity.
Only the selectively verified signatures are stored as witnesses. Conceptually,
this approach does not use data aggregation, but it achieves the same goal of
compressing evidence. However, since many signatures will not be verified/used,
this approach is actually based on a tradeoff between security and storage costs.
Besides, not much attention is paid to vehicle privacy. Hence, the proposal (see
Zhang et al., 2008) needs to be improved for practical deployment.
Cryptographic aggregation has recently been suggested in VANETs. In Zhu et
al. (2008), aggregate signatures are applied to authenticate emergency messages.
In an aggregate signature scheme, signatures on different messages are aggregated
into one regular signature which can convince a verifier that the signers agree
upon their respective messages. The verification of an aggregate signature is
similar to that of the underlying signatures. The proposal (see Zhu et al., 2008)
is implemented in the PKI setting and the certificate aggregation only allows one
CA; hence, this proposal suffers from the so-called single-point of failure weakness.
Although this scheme enables signature aggregation and certificate aggregation,
the public keys of vehicles cannot be aggregated. The resulting cryptographic
witnesses still grow linearly with time.
5. Simultaneous security, privacy and aggregation
in VANETs
As discussed above, the existing authentication schemes for V2V communications
suffer from heavy overhead introduced by signature relay, verification and storage,
or they cannot meet the goals of security and privacy. In this section, we propose
a solution simultaneously achieving the following goals:
• Security. Authentication, integrity and non-repudiation are provided, so
that explicit liability can be established in VANETs. This allows V2V com-
munication to be used for accident reconstruction and liability investigation.
• Conditional privacy. Privacy is guaranteed to honest vehicles. However, if
a vehicle behaves maliciously, it can be traced by a trusted third party.
• Data aggregation. Vehicular messages consist of non-cryptographic fields
(payload, time stamps, etc.) and cryptographic fields (signatures) necessary
to verify the validity of the former. Non-cryptographic fields contain much
redundant information and can be compressed using general-purpose com-
pression algorithms (see Welch, 1984). However, cryptographic fields look
random and cannot be compressed using general compression algorithms.
We focus on securely compressing cryptographic fields in VANETs.
We observe that ID-based aggregate signatures are especially suitable for se-
curing VANETs. In an ID-based aggregate signature scheme, a trusted private
key generator (PKG) has a master secret-public key pair. PKG takes as input his
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master secret key and each user’s identity to output the user’s private signing key.
Since a user can only get a secret signing key after registering to PKG, certificates
are unnecessary for users in an ID-based aggregate signature scheme. A registered
user can sign any message using her private signing key. The signature can be
verified with PKG’s master public key and the user’s identity. The distinguishing
feature of ID-based aggregate signatures is that independently generated signa-
tures can be aggregated into a single one, no matter whether these independent
signatures are on the same message and from the same signer or not. The validity
of all signatures can be verified by merely validating the aggregated signature.
The aggregatability of ID-based aggregate signatures matches both the security
and efficiency requirements of VANETs. The public key of PKG can be pre-
loaded onto the OBU of each vehicle. After receiving thousands of message-
signature pairs from vehicles in the permitted communication range, the verifier
can aggregate all the signatures into a single one, namely an aggregate signature,
and then verify it with one verification operation for all the received signatures. If
the verification shows that all the signatures are valid, then the vehicle can make
its driving decision.
5.1. High level description of the scheme
The above direct implementation of ID-based aggregate signatures in VANETs
does not guarantee privacy for vehicles because the vehicle-generated message
contains the identity of the message generator. To obtain an efficient privacy-
preserving solution, we suggest that each RSU managed by the transportation
administration department play the role of PKG. As shown in Fig. 1, for each
RSU we define the management coverage as the area reached by the neighboring
RSUs’ communication range. Hence, an RSU’s management coverage is usually
much larger than its communication range and neighboring RSUs’ management
domains may overlap. If the communication coverage of two neighboring RSUs
does not intersect, then vehicles on the road may relay the signed timestamp till it
reaches the communication coverage of the neighboring RSUs. By using relaying
vehicles, the management domains of RSUs can fully cover all the road sections,
even if the RSUs are sparse at the initial deployment stage of VANETs. This
implies that our system is very scalable.
A vehicle first registers to the transportation office and obtains a secret token
regarding its public identity. We assume that each RSU has two secret keys,
one master secret pseudonym key for generating pseudonyms and one master
secret signing key for generating private signing keys for vehicles. When passing
an RSU, the vehicle shows to the RSU that it holds a secret token regarding
its identity. Then the RSU generates a pseudonym for the vehicle by taking as
input its master secret pseudonym key, its name, a timestamp and the vehicle’s
identity. The RSU further generates a private signing key for the vehicle by taking
as input the pseudonym and its master secret signing key. The RSU stores the
timestamp and the vehicle’s identity in its local database and securely forwards
the pseudonym and the private signing key.
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Figure 1. System architecture
Table 1. Format of privacy-preserving vehicular messages
Payload Timestamp Pseudonym Signature
100 bytes 4 bytes 22 bytes 22 bytes
In the management domain of an RSU, any vehicle can anonymously produce
a signature on any vehicular message which can be verified by other vehicles in
the same management domain. A receiving vehicle accepts the vehicle-generated
message only if (1) the timestamp contained in the sending vehicle’s pseudonym
is consistent with the current time and, (2) the signature can be verified with
the current pseudonym and the RSU’s master public key corresponding to its
master secret signing key. With RSU-aided on-the-fly pseudonyms, no certificates
or revocation lists are required to preserve security and privacy in the proposed
system. The format of privacy-preserving vehicle-generated messages is illustrated
in Table 1. For each vehicle-generated packet, the payload field may include the
information on the vehicle’s position, direction and speed, as well as traffic events
encountered, event time and so on. According to DSRC, the payload of a message
is 100 bytes. A timestamp is used to specify the signature generation time, which
is employed to prevent replay attacks. We suggest to use the ID-based aggregate
signature scheme by Herranz (2006), which contains two group elements, each
about 22 bytes long.
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5.2. The Scheme
We briefly review bilinear maps underlying our vehicular authentication protocols.
Following the notations of Wu et al. (2009, 2011), we use PGen to represent
an algorithm which, on input of security parameter 1λ, outputs a tuple γ =
(p,G1, G2, GT , g1, g2, e), where finite cyclic groups G1 = 〈g1〉 and G2 = 〈g2〉 have
the same prime order p, and e : G1 × G2 → GT is an efficient non-degenerate
bilinear map such that e(g1, g2) = 1 and for all g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 and u, v ∈ Z,
e(gu1 , g
v
2) = e(g1, g2)
uv.
Global System Parameters: The algorithm PGen takes as input a security
parameter 1λ, and outputs a tuple γ = (p,G1, G2, GT , g1, g2, e). Here, G1 = G2 =
G and g1 = g2 = g. Three hash functions are selected: H : {0, 1}
∗ → Zp, H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → Zp and H2 : {0, 1}
∗ → G. The system parameters π =< λ, γ,H1, H2 >
are embedded into TAO, RSUs and OBUs.
TAO Key Generation: TAO randomly chooses its secret key skTAO ∈ Z
∗
p
and computes its public key PKTAO = g
skTAO . The TAO public key PKTAO is
also embedded into RSUs and OBUs, but the corresponding secret key skTAO ∈
Zp is only known by TAO.
RSU Key Generation: Each RSU has two secret keys, one master secret
pseudonym key for generating pseudonyms and one master secret signing key for
generating private signing keys for vehicles. An RSU randomly chooses x, y ∈ Z∗p
and computes X = gx, Y = gy as the RSU’s public key, where x and y are the
RSU’s secret keys for generating private signing keys and pseudonyms of vehicles,
respectively. Also, the RSU’s public key (X,Y ) needs to be certified by TAO with
a certificate CertRSU = H2(ID||X||Y ||PKTAO)
skTAO , where ID is the RSU’s
identity containing a timestamp specifying the time when the RSU public key is
certified. Each RSU’s public key (X,Y ) as well its certificate can be pre-verified
and embedded into TAO, RSUs and OBUs. For a large-scale VANET of up to one
thousand RSUs, this storage cost is only about 66K Bytes, which is affordable in
practice.
Vehicle Key Generation: A vehicle randomly picks skv ∈ Z
∗
p as its long-
term secret key and computes PKv = g
skv as its public key. The vehicle’s
public key PKv also needs to be certified by TAO with a certificate Certv =
H2(V ||PKv||PKTAO)
skTAO through a secure (i.e., confidential and authenticated)
channel, where V is the vehicle’s identity containing a timestamp specifying the
time when the vehicle’s public key is certified.
Pseudonym and Signing Key Generation: This interactive procedure
consists of two steps.
First, when a vehicle passes an RSU, it securely proves to the RSU that it is a
registered vehicular user. Let the vehicle V be at location Lv, the current time be
Tv, and the RSU have identity ID. The vehicle randomly selects γ ∈ Z
∗
p, and com-
putes gγ , a piece of registration argument argument = H2(V, Lv, Tv, ID)
skvCertv
and the ciphertext Enckey(V, Lv, Tv, PKv, Argument) using any secure symmet-
ric encryption algorithm Enc(·), where key = Y γ . The ciphertext and gγ are
sent to the RSU who can extract V, Lv, Tv, PKv, Argument with key = (g
γ)y.
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Then the RSU checks that (1) Lv and Tv are sound, and (2) e(argument, g) =
e(H2(V, Lv, Tv, ID), PKV )e(H2(V || PKv||PKTAO), PKTAO). Only if the check
passes, the RSU proceeds to the second step.
Second, the RSU returns an on-the-fly pseudonym and a corresponding signing
key to the vehicle both of which will expire if the vehicle leaves the RSU’s manage-
ment domain. To do this, the RSU computes r = H(y||V, Lv, Tv, PKv||ID, TID)
and R = gr, where R serves as a pseudonym of the vehicle and TID is the times-
tamp at which the pseudonym is issued by the RSU with ID. The RSU further
computes the value σ = r+xH1(ID, TID, R) mod p which later serves as a sign-
ing key of the requesting vehicle. Then the RSU returns Enck(R, σ, TID) to the
vehicle. Finally, the RSU adds (V, Lv, Tv, TID, PKv) to its local records, appended
by Argument′ ← Argument×Argument′ ∈ G where Argument′ is initialized to
1. One may note that (V, Lv, Tv, TID, PKv) can be significantly compressed be-
cause the regular location and time information contains much redundancy while
the long-term identity V and public key PKv are identical for the same vehicle.
Clearly, the vehicle can extract the pseudonym and the signing key. Their
correctness can be validated by checking whether gσ
?
= RXH1(ID,TID,R).
Signing Vehicular Reports: Let a vehicle receive a pseudonym Ri and a
signing key σi with a timestamp TIDi from the RSU with identity IDi. When
it wants to sign a report mi, it computes θ = H2(mi, IDi, TIDi , Ri)
σi as the
resulting signature on mi. The vehicle sends the authenticated vehicular message
Mi = (mi, IDi, TIDi , Ri, θi) to other vehicles nearby.
Aggregation and Verification: Assume that a vehicle receives n vehi-
cular messages Mi = (mi, IDi, TIDi , Ri, θi) to be verified in an interval, where
one can have IDi = IDj while mi = mj . The vehicle computes the aggregate
θA =
∏n
i=1 θi for reports m1, · · · ,mn. The verifying vehicle accepts (m1, · · · ,mn)
if the contained location and time information is inconsistent and e(θA, g) =∏n
i=1 e(H2(mi, IDi, TIDi , Ri), Ri ·X
H1(IDi,TIDi ,Ri)).
Finally, the verifying vehicle adds
Mi = (m1|| · · · ||mi−1; (ID1, TID1)|| · · · ||(IDi−1, TIDi−1); θ1 · · · θi−1)
to its local database M.
One may note that the last field is always of constant size, i.e., 22 bytes in
the above proposal, while the rest of fields contain redundant non-cryptographic
data which can be greatly compressed. The saving in storage cost is significant.
5.3. Tracing authorship of questionable reports
Even if the vehicular reports are signed and verified to be authentic, they may
contain untruthful information. If a vehicle was misguided by an untruthful re-
port, the original vehicle signing this report can be identified by an RSU. Let the
authenticated report m be indeed untruthful. The receiving vehicle can later find
the corresponding (ID, TID) item in its local records and report it to the RSU
with identity ID. With TID the RSU can trace the real identity of the dishonest
vehicle V (Refer to the procedure of Pseudonym and Signing Key Generation).
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5.4. Secret key updates
One advantage of the above scheme is easy secret key updating, if the secret key
SKID is compromised before its expiry date, for example, because of an attack or
an accidental exposure. Compared to most other ID-based schemes, our scheme
need not change the secret key x of the TAO or the public hash function H1 or the
secret keys of other vehicles and RSUs to update the secret key of an individual
vehicle. This is because the ID-based signature scheme we use is probabilistic: the
secret key for an identity ID is a Schnorr (probabilistic) signature SKID = (R, σ)
obtained from TAO by choosing at random r ∈ Zp and then computing R = g
r
and σ = r + xH1(ID, TID, R). If this secret key of a vehicle is compromised,
TAO can compute and distribute a new secret pair (R′, σ′) for this vehicle by just
choosing a different value r′. In this way, the rest of the vehicles and RSUs can
keep their secret keys, because the parameters of PKG remain unchanged.
5.5. Storage, verification and relay of vehicular reports
In a VANET, a vehicle periodically receives a large number of messages with ap-
pended signatures for verification. Usually, these signatures are verified separately
and the verification is time-consuming. Some recent proposals suggest batch ver-
ification to speed up the verification process. To enable a provably secure batch
verification (see Wu et al., 2010), a linear number of additional exponentiations
is required. Hence, the batch verification approach can only partially relieve the
verification overhead. By employing aggregate signatures in VANETs, the re-
ceived signatures can be aggregated into a single signature and then be verified
as a normal signature. The aggregation operation needs only n multiplications
rather than n exponentiations and, for security in a cryptographic sense, the in-
volved multiplications are usually two orders of magnitude more efficient than
the corresponding exponentiations. Hence, aggregate verification allows vehicles
to quickly respond to driving environment challenges.
Vehicular messages which have been verified to be valid should be stored for
possible liability investigation. However, as time passes, the vehicular messages
received by each vehicle grow linearly but the OBU’s storage capacity is limited.
This conflict can be mitigated by aggregate signatures: the receiving vehicle only
needs to save the aggregate signature. If new message-signature pairs are received,
the new signatures and the stored aggregate signature can be re-aggregated into
a new aggregate signature to be stored. Hence, a vehicle needs to store only
one signature, no matter how many message-signature pairs are received. We
also suggest that the receiving vehicle generate an aggregate signature to show
that it has verified the validity of the stored messages. As for the pseudonym
domain, since the pseudonym in each vehicular message can be reconstructed by
the issuer (i.e., an RSU) of the pseudonym with the timestamp and the RSU’s
location contained in the message, the receiving vehicle does not need to store
the pseudonyms for each message. The format of the stored aggregate vehicular
message is illustrated in Table 2; note that the pseudonyms do not need to be
stored and N is the total number of the RSUs. In the table, we do not specify the
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Table 2. Format of the stored aggregate vehicular message (Bytes)
Payload Timestamp RSU ID Pseudonym Signature
100n 4n ≤ 10N 0 22 bytes
Table 3. Format of forwarded vehicular messages (Bytes)
Payload Timestamp RSU ID Pseudonym Signature
100n 4n+ 4 22n 22n 22+22
compression effect on non-cryptographic data which, as mentioned above, can be
compressed by using general-purpose compression algorithms.
Some valid messages might need to be forwarded to the management domains
of other RSUs. The verifying vehicle can remove the original signatures and en-
dorse them with a new signature. The endorser’s pseudonym needs to be included
so that its anonymous signature can be verified by other vehicles. Also, the en-
dorsing vehicle needs to add a new timestamp to reflect the endorsement time.
The non-cryptographic data contained in the payload and timestamp fields can
be greatly compressed before being forwarded, as they contain much redundancy.
5.6. Security and performance
In this section, we briefly show that the security, privacy and aggregation goals
are achieved in the above proposal.
Firstly, the unforgeability of ID-based aggregate signatures guarantees authen-
tication, integrity and non-repudiation in vehicular communications. Unforgeabil-
ity implies that only a registered vehicle can sign and endorse vehicular messages
and, if there is any modification in any signature or any signed message, the ag-
gregate verification procedure will signal the modified message-signature pair as
invalid. Hence, if a verifying vehicle receives a batch of vehicular messages and
the aggregate verification shows that the aggregate signature is valid, then these
messages must come from authentic sources and have not been tampered with
since they were originated; accordingly, the message generators cannot deny that
they have agreed on these messages. If one or more messages in the batch are
invalid, the aggregate verification fails. In this case, it is known that an efficient
binary algorithm can be employed to find the invalid messages, similarly to the
batch verification approaches in existing proposals.
The proposed solution preserves conditional privacy. On the one hand, when-
ever a vehicle generates a message-signature pair, only a pseudonym is specified
in the message. Also, the pseudonym is different for different vehicles. For the
same vehicle, the same pseudonym will be used only as long as the vehicle re-
mains in the management domain of the RSU which generated that pseudonym.
Next time the same vehicle enters the same management domain, its pseudonym
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will change as the pseudonym is also determined by a timestamp. Hence, for an
attacker eavesdropping vehicular communications (see Table 1), the pseudonym
cannot be linked to the real identity of the message-generating vehicle. On the
other hand, if some signed messages were later found untruthful and harmful to
some vehicle, the data (see Table 2) stored in the harmed vehicle and other wit-
ness vehicles can be used to trace the message generators and establish liability.
From the payload of each message, the location of the pseudonym-issuing RSU
is retrieved and this (trusted) RSU can recover the pseudonym of the message
generator with its master secret key combined with the timestamp in the mes-
sage. The pseudonym is uniquely bound with the real identity of some registered
vehicle. Since the aggregate signature can be verified to be valid, the originator of
the message cannot deny authorship of the message due to the non-repudiability
of the aggregate signature. Hence, the vehicles signing cheating messages can be
caught by using aggregate cryptographic fields.
As to performance, let us examine storage and computation. Table 2 shows
that the storage saving for cryptographic fields (i.e., pseudonyms and signatures)
is very impressive: pseudonyms do not need to be stored and signatures are
compressed into constant length, i.e., 22 bytes, no matter how many message-
signature pairs are received. Without the above mechanisms, the size of both the
stored pseudonyms and signatures would be linear with time and might be up to
the order of 1011 bytes (see Section 2 and note that many pseudonyms are also
stored as evidences). Regarding computation, aggregate verification costs much
less than separate verifications. Aggregate verification is also more efficient than
batch verification, which requires a linear number of exponentiations. Finally, the
proposed solution allows for aggregate message relay without requiring to forward
a large number of signatures appended to the original messages. Instead, only one
new signature is generated and forwarded, at a cost of a new 4-byte timestamp
and a 22-byte pseudonym of the endorser.
6. Robust system setup
In the basic protocol, a single TAO generates the private key for each party. If
the TAO is hacked, the whole system will be jeopardized. Further, if the TAO
occasionally collapses, then new vehicles cannot join the system. Hence, it is
essential to address these concerns to deploy the scheme in the real world. For this
goal, we present a robust system setup generation with secret-sharing techniques.
In the improved scheme, only the TAO Key Generation and RSU Key Generation
and Vehicle Key Generation procedures will be modified while the other procedures
will remain unchanged.
6.1. Underlying secret sharing technology
We employ Shamir’s (t, k)-threshold secret sharing scheme (see Shamir, 1979).
Let Zp be a finite field with p > k and x ∈ Zp be the secret to be shared. The
master TAO picks a polynomial p(α) of degree at most t−1 at random, whose free
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term is the secret x, that is, p(0) = skTAO ∈ Zp. The master TAO sets its public
key as K = gx ∈ G. The polynomial p(α) can be written as p(α) = s+
∑t−1
j=1 ajα
j ,
where aj ∈ Zp has been randomly chosen. Each TAOi is assigned a known index
i = 1, · · · , k and the master TAO privately sends to TAOi a share skTAOi = p(i)
and erases skTAO and ai after TAOi receives skTAOi for i = 1, · · · , k. Then any
set A ⊂ {1, · · · , k} of at least t TAOi’s can recover the secret p(0) = skTAO by
interpolating the set of shares they hold
p(0) =
∑
i∈A
skTAOiλi =
∑
i∈A
skTAOi(
j =i∏
j∈A
j
j − i
)
where λi =
∏j =i
j∈A
j
j−i
are the Lagrange coefficients.
6.2. Robust TAO key generation
With the above secret-sharing technique, a set A of t TAOi’s can first jointly
generate system public key as follows. Each active TAOi in the set A computes
its public key PKTAOi = g
skTAO . Then the system public key PKTAO can be
recovered by computing PKTAO =
∏
i∈A PKTAOiλi = g
∑
i∈A
λiskTAOi = gskTAO .
Note that in this procedure each party does not need leak its private share skTAOi .
Also, no party knows the master system secret key skTAO.
6.3. Robust RSU key certificate generation
As in the basic protocol, each RSU has two secret keys, one master secret pseudo-
nym key for generating pseudonyms and one master secret signing key for generat-
ing private signing keys for vehicles. The RSUs are allowed to generate their keys
locally. However, their corresponding certificates will be generated in a robust
way. That is, if some TAOs are occasionally unavailable, new RSUs can also be
deployed or some RSUs can also update their keys and certificate if they are com-
promised. In this case, an RSU randomly chooses x, y ∈ Z∗p and computes X =
gx, Y = gy as the RSU’s public key, where x and y are the RSU’s secret keys for
generating private signing keys and pseudonyms of vehicles, respectively. Also, the
RSU’s public key (X,Y ) needs to be certified. For this goal, TAOi ∈ A computes
a certificate share CertRSU,i = H2(ID||X||Y ||PKTAO)
skTAOi , where ID is the
RSU’s identity containing a timestamp specifying the time when the RSU public
key is certified. After obtaining t shares, the RSU can compute the resulting cer-
tificate CertRSU =
∏
i∈A CertRSU,iλi = H2(ID||X||Y ||PKTAO)
∑
i∈A
λiskTAOi =
H2(ID||X||Y ||PKTAO)
skTAO .
6.4. Robust vehicle key certificate generation
Similarly, the vehicles are also allowed to generate their keys locally but their
corresponding certificates will be generated in a robust way. This means that,
if some TAOs are occasionally unavailable, new vehicles can also register to the
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system or update their keys and certificate if they are compromised. For this
goal, a vehicle randomly picks skv ∈ Z
∗
p as its long-term secret key and com-
putes PKv = g
skv as its public key. To get this public key certified, the ve-
hicle contacts an active TAOi ∈ A and obtains a certificate share Certv,i =
H2(V ||PKv||PKTAO)
skTAOi through a secure channel. After obtaining t certifi-
cate shares from different TAOi’s, the vehicle can locally compute the result-
ing certificate Certv =
∏
i∈A Certv,iλi = H2(V ||PKv||PKTAO)
∑
i∈A
λiskTAOi =
H2(V ||PKv||PKTAO)
skTAO .
In the improved system setup procedures, there exist k TAOs and at least
t(1 < t < k) of them will distributively generate certificate for each RSU and
each vehicle. Hence, the system can work securely even if some TAOs collapse
or are compromised, provided that the number of simultaneously collapsing or
compromised TAOs is at most k − t. These features imply that the system is
robust against accidental failures and malicious attacks.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed the state of the art in achieving security, privacy,
and data aggregation in vehicular communications. We have argued that target-
ing those three properties separately cannot meet the requirements of VANETs.
We have presented a comprehensive solution to attain those three conflicting
goals. A set of new mechanisms have been described for efficiently managing
identities and securely compressing cryptographic witnesses, two major problems
in strong VANET security deployment. Our analysis shows that security, pri-
vacy, and data aggregation can be well conciliated and simultaneously achieved
in VANETs. Robustness is also achieved and the system can work well enven if
some administrative authorities are compromised. These features imply that our
protocol is efficient and practical.
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